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ABSTRACT:
Many democratic and jurisprudential theorists have too often uncritically accepted
Alexander Bickel's notion of "the countermajoritarian difficulty" when considering the
relationship between judicial review and democracy; this is the case for arguments both
for and against judicial review. This framework is both theoretically and empirically
unsustainable. Democracy is not wholly synonymous with majoritarianism, and judicial
review is not inherently countermajoritarian in the first place. In modern democratic
political systems, judicial review is one of many potential veto points. Since all modern
democratic political systems contain veto points, the relevant and unexplored question is
what qualities might make a veto point relatively democratic. Proceeding on the
assumption that democracy's primary normative value is found in its opposition to
domination by both state and private actors, we make a preliminary effort to delineate
what qualities a democratic veto point might have, identifying five criteria, and evaluate
judicial review using these criteria. We conclude that judicial review's performance
against these criteria is decidedly mixed, but in the final balance is likely to be a modest
net positive for democracy, particularly when compared to other veto points commonly
found in contemporary democratic political systems.

Introduction
For half a century, following the publication of Alexander Bickel’s landmark
study The Least Dangerous Branch, defenders and critics of judicial review have shared
the view that judicial review presents a particular challenge for democratic theory. On
this account, the countermajoritarian character of constitutional judicial review marks it
as “deviant” within democratic political systems, requiring extra scrutiny and
justification.1 This approach, known as the “countermajoritarian difficulty,” is becoming
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increasingly untenable.2 Courts are not reliably countermajoritarian, nor are legislatures
reliably majoritarian.3 The establishment and exercise of judicial review frequently
entails collaboration between the judicial and elected political branches, as opposed to a
zero-sum struggle for power.4 Furthermore, democracy (in theory and practice) has
always consisted of a good deal more than simple majoritarianism.5 And, indeed, few
scholars who evaluate judicial review from the standpoint of the countermajoritarian
difficulty would seriously argue otherwise. A more sophisticated assessment of judicial
review’s role in a democratic state requires a more viable conception of what sort of
institutional arrangements might be considered democratic. Some scholars have
attempted to analyze judicial review from the standpoint of deliberative democracy.6
Others have argued that the “democracy-against-domination” approach seen in the works
of Ian Shapiro, Phillip Pettit, and others is a useful approach for evaluating the
democratic valence of judicial review.7 We will consider judicial review from the latter
perspective, but depart from previous efforts by focusing on judicial review’s nonexceptional character.
Both a key distorting effect of the countermajoritarian difficulty framework and a
more promising way forward are identified in Barry Friedman’s history of the importance
of the countermajoritarian difficulty within legal scholarship:
[T]here is an interesting question of political theory concerning how judicial
review fits into the fabric of majoritarian democracy, but . . . this is not what most
constitutional theorists address either. The theorist truly devoted to problems of
democratic theory would want to examine each and every institution of
democratic governance on this basis, from the least representative - such as the
Federal Reserve Board, or independent administrative agencies, or the Senate for
that matter - to the seemingly most representative, such as the House of
Representatives. Constitutional theorists rarely address these institutions or devote
any sustained attention to the real questions of political theory they present . . . the
academic tradition examined here is court-obsessed.8
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Friedman is right to emphasize that assessments of judicial review’s democratic
legitimacy are meaningful only in the proper comparative institutional context. All liberal
democracies diffuse power among numerous institutions and scores of actors, and (since
all of these institutions have some measure of autonomy from public control and none of
these institutions operate without constraint) these institutions in practice cannot easily be
sorted into “majoritarian” and “countermajoritarian” categories. Judicial review’s status
as a veto point tells us little about its democratic legitimacy.
Assessing judicial review as practiced from a democratic perspective will not be
easy. The judicial power to nullify acts of elected branches cannot be assumed to have the
same democratic effects operating within a highly centralized Westminster system that it
has in a decentralized, veto point-laden Madisonian system. Nor will judges applying an
eighteenth-century constitutional text within nineteenth-century constitutional norms
have the same political effects as judges applying twentieth-century texts within twentyfirst-century constitutional norms. Of course, this is true of other veto points in
democratic systems as well—their function within the overall democratic system varies
substantially, depending on numerous features of that system’s institutional structure and
prevailing norms.
In other words, determining the democratic status of all veto points as a general
matter is doomed to fail. But asserting that nothing can be said about the democratic
properties of a particular veto point without access to all the particulars of a given context
is unsatisfying as well. Therefore, we adopt a middle-ground strategy here—we will
consider the veto point of judicial review in an explicitly comparative context. More
specifically, we will examine how a democracy-against-domination approach might
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evaluate courts as one of many veto points. We proceed as follows: First, we examine
the arguments of those who critique judicial review on the terms of the
countermajoritarian difficulty, identifying ways in which they are led astray by their
treatment of judicial review as a unique veto point. We then identify five criteria on
which the democratic value of veto points might be measured, from a democracy-againstdomination perspective, and briefly consider the relative likely value of judicial review
on these grounds. Judicial review seems to hold up relatively well compared to other
common veto points in contemporary democratic systems—whatever its democratic
shortcomings, they are no greater, and possibly less worrisome, than other veto points,
such as the filibuster and bicameralism.

Judicial Review in Contemporary Democratic Theory
Judicial review’s democratic standing has been the subject of sustained theoretical
attention in recent years, and Jeremy Waldron is one of judicial review’s most important
democratic critics. His approach to democratic theory is broadly consistent with the
countermajoritarian difficulty hypothesis. His recent work contains both a sustained
defense of the democratic content of legislative processes and outcomes as well as a
sustained critique of judicial review on both countermajoritarian and consequentialist
grounds. Waldron’s appreciation for the ‘majority-procedure’ feature of legislative action
is based on what he takes to be the normative point of democracy—which is to give equal
respect to persons under conditions of persistent disagreement.9 While Waldron concedes
that equal respect doesn’t logically or necessarily require majority-procedure, he does
suggest that such a procedure is warranted given that “the problems we face pose
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themselves urgently for us in the circumstances of politics, and in particular in the
circumstance of disagreement about what would be just, a moral or at any rate an
appropriate solution.”10 He is skeptical that any substantive requirement of political
equality can be removed from the procedural requirements of majority rule, as even if
political equality is a widely shared goal, disagreement will quickly reemerge when we
try to determine the substantive meaning of political equality.
What does this all mean for judicial review? It begins at a democratic
disadvantage for Waldron because courts do not, like legislatures, “internalize those
disagreements [about social justice in society] by building them into the institutional
structure of our assembly (with arrangements like government benches and opposition
benches, majority and minority parties, debates, rules of order, whips, and roll-calls),
indeed by making them part of our law-making.”11 But here Waldron incorporates some
potentially countermajoritarian features of legislatures into his democratic theory by
suggesting that they represent the importation of the specific nature of a particular
society’s disagreements about social justice.12 The crux of his critique of judicial review
is that the liberal fears commonly associated with majority rule without judicial review—
specifically, fears about a Madisonian “tyranny of the majority”—are not unique to
legislative supremacy. A form of tyranny is possible regardless of the details of the final
moment in decision-making.13 Therefore, legislative supremacy is superior to a system of
constitutional judicial review for two reasons, one philosophical and one pragmatic. The
philosophical reason is that it is the decision-rule most clearly consistent with equal
respect.14 The pragmatic reason is that Waldron suspects that judicial review will do no
better at protecting the rights of minorities than legislative supremacy.15
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The latter claim is, of course, highly contingent. Waldron correctly and
appropriately notes many moments in American constitutional history when the Supreme
Court has notably failed to protect minority rights. We agree with Waldron that judicial
review isn’t inherently necessary for liberal democracy,16 nor is it a universally reliable
and effective protector of vulnerable and unpopular minorities. Furthermore, we agree
that judicial review would likely be an ineffective barrier against emergent tyranny.17 But
contingent empirical examples cut both ways. The structure and rules of legislatures
cannot be counted on to efficiently and effectively translate majority political preferences
into legislative outcomes, and courts may at times do a better job of doing exactly that.
So barring a more systematic approach to empirical matters, the
empirical/consequentialist element of this dispute cannot be resolved in a satisfying
manner.
What of Waldron’s philosophical account of the normative desirability of
legislative supremacy? Waldron contends that the normative point of democracy is equal
respect. But as Christopher Eisgruber notes, “majority rule” is but one possible
interpretation of the procedural manifestation of equal respect.18 Furthermore, some of
the reasons Waldron gives for preferring majoritarian decision-making (in particular,
May’s theorem) do not appear to justify ceding power to representative institutions.19
The core problem here is that Waldron conflates ordinary legislative procedure and
majoritarian decision-making.20 Waldron asserts that “the people are entitled to govern
themselves by their own judgments,”21 an entitlement that is extrapolated from the core
right to political participation, which is inexorably linked to our reliance on our own
judgments. Political participation, according to Waldron, occupies a special ontological
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status amongst existing recognized human rights due not to any normative priority but
because “participation is a right whose exercise seems peculiarly appropriate in situations
where reasonable rights-bearers disagree about what rights they have.”22 But here the
epistemic move from “the people” to legislative bodies and legislative supremacy in
particular is made far too easily. For precisely the reasons Waldron wants to embrace
majority rule, we must question fully conflating majority rule with democracy.
Unsurprisingly, Waldron fails to make the case that majority rule is neutral, and later he
backs off this claim altogether.23 Here Waldron’s insistence on taking disagreement
seriously undermines his conclusions—reasonable disagreement about which dispersal of
political powers best promotes equal respect for citizens is not hard to imagine.
Waldron does not fully consider how judicial review functions within
contemporary democracies, and in so doing both overestimates the autonomy of courts
and underestimates the many ways in which the other branches are able to diffuse
democratic responsibility. Waldron assumes that liberal democracies include
“safeguards” such as “bicameralism, robust committee scrutiny, and multiple levels of
consideration, debate and voting.”24 All of these features—in addition to other common
features of modern democratic states, such as independent agencies in charge of
monetary policy—frustrate majority will and dilute accountability. In the American
political system, for example, the committee system and the structure and rules of the US
Senate were much more important in preventing reforms to Jim Crow laws than the
Supreme Court.25 Another example of the way in which his assumptions about relations
between courts and legislatures is insufficiently complex can be seen in his discussion of
Canada’s “notwithstanding clause,” which allows federal and provincial legislatures to
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override judicial review by announcing their intention to deviate from the demands of the
charter.26 Waldron correctly points out that “[in] practice, however, the notwithstanding
clause is rarely invoked” and for that reason considers Canada’s regime of judicial review
a form of “strong” review, like the US, for the purposes of his argument.27 The fact that
legislatures who could override substantive constitutional rulings with a simple majority
in a centralized Parliamentary system virtually never do so raises serious questions about
Waldron’s assumptions that judicial review operates in a presumptively
countermajoritarian and “undemocratic” fashion. The legislature must, according to
Waldron, “misrepresent its position on rights” to use the notwithstanding clause, and is
impaired by “the legislature is always somewhat at the mercy of the courts’ public
declarations about the meaning of the society’s Bill or Charter of Rights.”28 But this is an
empirical claim, and a strange one for someone with Waldron’s belief in the democratic
legitimacy of legislatures to assume, unquestioningly, to be accurate. Why would the
citizenry automatically side with an unelected court over an elected legislature in a
conflict over the nature of rights? The fact that Canadian legislators disdain the use of
powerful weapons to oppose the exercise of judicial review (as do American legislators,
who rarely use the powerful tools given to them in Article III—including jurisdictionstripping and court packing) powerfully suggests that judicial review is both more
normatively legitimate and more consistent with the general preferences of elected
legislators than Waldron’s assumptions imply.29 And while the possibility that judicial
review allows legislators to diffuse responsibility for difficult policy choices presents a
serious challenge for democratic legitimacy, these problems are indistinguishable from
the problems created by many other veto points.
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Waldron fails to properly evaluate judicial review as one of many veto points in a
democratic system. This error is a common one, dating back at least to Alexander
Bickel’s influential formulation of judicial review as a “deviant” institution in American
politics over fifty years ago.30 But legislative majorities may be thwarted at various points
in the process, ranging from formal to informal.31 Waldron, when arguing against judicial
review on behalf of “majority decision,” implies that veto points are never justifiable.32
However, when arguing on behalf of “ordinary legislative procedure,” the various veto
points embedded in both that procedure (as well as the enactment of legislative
outcomes) are not directly discussed but seem to be assumed.33
Waldron’s core error—his failure to evaluate judicial review in an institutional
comparative context—it replicated by many other recent democratic critics of judicial
review. Richard Bellamy’s republican case for political rather than legal
constitutionalism contains an even stronger version of Waldron’s critique of judicial
review, relying on a similar argument from the fact of disagreement as a central feature of
the circumstances of politics.34 Throughout, he distinguishes between two kinds of
decision-making procedures: democratic and legal. The former are associated with
majoritarianism; the latter, with countermajoritarianism. Because the latter elevate the
views of some above others, they are not consistent with the value of political equality,
and open the door for potential domination. The potential for veto points associated with
legislative processes are not entirely ignored by Bellamy, but are downplayed relative to
judicial veto points in large part because they are closer to the act of voting, which
contains the requirements for a non-dominating procedure: “Giving each and every
citizen one (and only one) vote in a general election offers a rough and ready and easy
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way to verify form of ensuring all citizens views carry the same weight in collective
decision-making.”35
This approach makes the same fundamental error as Waldron’s: a number of veto
points, particularly those found in the organization of the legislature, suggest the
democratic side of political decision-making fails to live up to the standard suggested
here. Beyond that, even at the moment of a democratic election, the standard of equality
suggested here is rarely met. Bellamy correctly takes some of judicial review’s defenders
to task for contrasting idealized exercises of judicial review with the flawed realities of
legislative politics. But here he is guilty of a similar idealization of elections. Virtually all
contemporary democracies feature some degree of malapportionment in one or more
legislative bodies, which is persistent and generally favors some categories of voters
(often rural voters) over others.36 As Adam Przeworski recently noted, “no rule of
collective decision-making other than unanimity can render causal efficacy to equal
individual participation.”37 So even at the procedural level, democratic elections as
practiced don’t live up the standard Bellamy holds out for them, even before we consider
the legislative veto points that will frustrate strong political equality after the election.
There is no configuration of democratic politics that fully meets the procedural demands
of political equality.
Another important critique of judicial review has been developed by
constitutional populists such as Larry Kramer38 and Mark Tushnet.39 Kramer’s popular
constitutionalism can be placed in the context of progressive scholars using the tools of
originalism to challenge the conclusions of conservative originalists.40 Kramer attempts
to demonstrate with voluminous historical data that as generally understood at the time of
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the framing, constitutional limits on the government were enforced through popular will,
not by the courts. Certain limited forms of judicial review can be consistent with this
understanding, but contemporary judicial supremacy is not. Ultimately, evaluations of
judicial review must rest on pragmatic and consequentialist grounds rather than historical
ones, and like Waldron, Kramer does not explain why judicial review (as opposed to
other countermajoritarian veto points intended to impose limits on the state) is uniquely
problematic. However, his point that “the people themselves” cannot be presumed to be
incompetent to interpret the Constitution is an important one that should inform any
evaluation of judicial review.
Tushnet’s populist case against judicial review—even the relatively modest forms
Kramer finds acceptable—is of significant potential interest in the context of comparing
judicial review to other veto points. Tushnet advocates a populist constitutionalism that
privileges the “thin constitution” (most notably, the broad abstractions of the preamble
and the Declaration of Independence) over the “thick constitution” (the detailed
distribution of power and establishment of procedures that dominates the first three
Articles of the Constitution).41 Tushnet’s version of populist constitutionalism would
seem to imply serious democratic problems with any veto points that interfere with
popular sovereignty, since veto points are quintessentially “thick constitutional” devices.
Given his focus on judicial review, however, Tushnet does not pursue a comparative
analysis of thick constitutional veto points.
One recent critic of judicial review, importantly, does not treat it as a uniquely
problematic or deviant institution. In an important new book Melissa Schwartzberg
considers (with particular attention to the process of constitutional amendment but
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general democratic decision-making as well) the status of different veto points and
procedural hurdles in both historical and analytic terms.42 She argues that veto points and
procedural hurdles can be grouped into two categories: those that straightforwardly and
clearly lead to supermajority rules, and create the opportunity for minority veto power,
and those that don’t appear to be in conflict with legislative majoritarianism. The latter
don’t violate majoritarian rule but create “complex majoritarianism.”43 Examples of
complex majoritarianism rules include popular referendums, requiring a second
affirmative vote following the next election, and deliberative citizen assemblies of the
sort used in British Columbia’s electoral reforms.44 Schwartzberg argues that a
democratic system could plausibly be designed in such a way that the veto points of
complex majoritarianism could replace supermajoritarian veto points, including judicial
review, accomplishing whatever legitimate aims such rules might have with significantly
fewer democratic costs. We have few substantive quarrels with this argument, and indeed
find the constitutional vision she offers potentially attractive under the right conditions.
Our differences with Schwartzberg primarily revolve around the level of analysis: we
wish to consider the democratic value of different veto points in the context of actually
existing democratic institutions, which, without exception, contain countermajoritarian
veto points, whereas Schwartzberg’s approach is more broadly systemic. In embracing
the assumption that countermajoritarian veto points appear to be inevitable under the
current conditions for democratic governance, we are not making a claim that they are
conceptually or normatively necessary for democracy in a greater sense. Insofar as
countermajoritarian veto points remain common, an analysis of their comparative value is
useful even if there exists a strong independent case for complex majoritarianism.
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While we have focused our attention on judicial review’s critics here, we wish to
briefly comment on a common strategy for defending judicial review that we reject, and
explain why. The most common democratic defense of judicial review takes the form of
what Peter Railton calls a “bulwark theory” of judicial review.45 What judicial review is
said to provide a bulwark against varies, but the structure of such theories remains the
same: Majoritarian democracy is associated with a threat, and judicial review empowers
judges to protect against that danger. The harm prevented by avoiding this danger
outweighs whatever harm (if any) is done to democratic procedure by the exercise of a
judicial veto point. Perhaps the most common form of bulwark theory concerns the
possibility of democratically authorized rights violations against unpopular minorities or
individuals.46 Other bulwark theories focus on the protection of democratic procedural
rights,47 the proper boundaries of public reason for political discourse,48 and the proper
balance between honoring democratic procedures and ensuring democratic outcomes.49
The differences between bulwark theories are less important to us than their
similar structure. As a justification for the granting of a specific institutionalized form of
political power, they fall short. In our assessment of bulwark defenses of judicial review,
we find ourselves in partial agreement with judicial review’s critics: insofar as judicial
review functions as a defense of minorities against majorities, it will often be the case
that the minorities whose interests are protected will be those who need it least.50 This
isn’t, however, in itself a reason to reject judicial review, but rather a reason to appreciate
the dangers and flaws we must recognize in any institutional arrangement. Institutions
cannot be justified solely by an account of how the persons who occupy them ought to
ideally wield power. Any non-ideal defense of judicial review must start with the likely
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effects of that particular institutionalization of power, recognizing that it may be occupied
by flawed and untrustworthy characters. Judicial review can and will be exploited for
undemocratic or illiberal purposes. No veto point or institutional arrangement can avoid
this possibility, and all of them could avoid such outcomes if we could stipulate ideal
behavior on the part of the relevant actors.

Veto Points and Democratic Theory
What would a consideration of judicial review’s democratic status look like if we
treated it as one possible veto point amongst many, rather than a uniquely deviant
institution? This is the question to which we now turn. The literature on veto points in
political systems has largely emerged from social and public choice theory, not normative
democratic or legal theory.51 Before we can begin to consider judicial review’s
democratic status, we must first consider what a democratic approach to veto points in
general might look like. We will assume that some veto points are inevitable, even in the
most majoritarian of democratic political systems, due largely to the size, scope, and
complexity of modern politics. So what might render a veto point more or less
democratic? How one answers this question will turn on the question of what one holds
to be the normative point of democracy. As indicated earlier, we align our analysis here
with an emerging school of thought propounding that democracy’s purpose is to avoid,
prevent, lessen, or eradicate domination.52 This position holds that preventing domination
by government officials through the threat of removal via election is a normatively
valuable feature of democracy. But democracy-against-domination must also consider
other sources of potential domination. Domination is not solely the purview of the state,
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as private domination in various forms remains a routine feature of modern life even in
liberal societies.
While a full defense of this approach is beyond our scope here, a few points can
be made. First, while only a handful of theorists have defined democracy in this way,
opposition to domination is close to the heart of a number of different approaches to
democracy, although they approach it in a variety of ways. For deliberativists, the rules,
context, and requirements of proper deliberation are important in part because they
prevent some democratic actors from dominating others in democratic decision-making.
For agonists, a key task of democratic theories is to make sense of or discover
possibilities for democratic action and agency for actors who are dominated, oppressed,
or otherwise excluded. For liberal democrats, the limits of democracy (and, in some
versions, institutional limits on it) are designed to prevent the majority from dominating
the minority, whereas the practice of democracy more broadly is a tool to prevent
domination of the citizens by the state. This approach should have broad appeal to many
of those who adhere to other schools of democratic thought.
Second, democracy-against-domination provides a distinctively valuable way of
evaluating state action and institutions. Domination captures the fundamental danger of
state power (that it can easily come to dominate the citizenry) while at the same time
motivating the creation of a sufficiently powerful state to prevent citizens from
dominating each other. A democracy-against-domination theory of the state thus becomes
a balancing act—the state must be powerful enough to effectively thwart dominium when
possible, but not so powerful that it evades the control of its citizens and risks slipping
into imperium. In applying this democracy-against-domination theory to veto points as a
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way of analyzing judicial review, we are following Michael Saward’s call to move
democratic theory away from too great a focus on democratic principles and their precise
application and toward identifying democratic devices which have the potential to
activate and advance democratic principles.53 A veto point becomes a potential
democratic device when it makes a contribution to either dominium prevention or
imperium prevention, without heightening the danger of the other to an equal or greater
degree. This democratic theory presents a clear picture of what we should want from
democratic institutional arrangements above and beyond merely being representative or
majoritarian.
How can democracy-against-domination generate heuristics for comparative veto
point evaluation? Pettit argues that democracy requires two dimensions: authorial and
editorial. The overall goal of both is to match policy with the common good (or, in
Pettit’s terminology, “common avowable interests”), which should guide non-dominating
governance. The authorial dimension of democratic politics is idea generation, and runs
the risk of what Pettit calls “false positives”—ill-advised ideas that do not serve the
public good or reduce domination.54 The editorial dimension of democracy, when
functioning properly, eliminates these false positives through “scrutinize-and-disallow”
mechanisms. Pettit’s conception of democracy is appealing, although it exaggerates the
separation between these two parts of the democratic process. To the extent that veto
points serve this editorial democratic function, they occur at many different stages of the
process, sometimes early in the authorial stage. To the extent that democratic politics can
be understood in terms of these two dimensions, they cannot be sorted out as cleanly and
clearly as he suggests.55
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Nevertheless, we can hope that, in the best case, Pettit’s image of the editorial
function is a good way to think of what veto points in democratic systems might, provide.
At their worst, veto points thwart democratic majorities through the capricious whims or
craven self-interest of powerful veto players—and no veto point is immune from
potentially being used for this purpose. If we assume that veto points are inevitable, we
should focus not on how to prevent them but on how to evaluate, shape, and reform them
to serve democratic goals as well as possible. What characterizes veto points better suited
to help prevent domination? We suggest five criteria for evaluating democratic veto
points. This list is not intended to be exhaustive, and does not deny the existence of
additional important criteria unrelated to the normative ends of democracy. (The
complexity of the modern state, for example, inevitably includes committee systems
where legislators can acquire and deploy at least some expertise over some areas of
policy, whether or not committee systems tend to reduce domination.) Nonetheless, these
categories can provide a useful guide to considering the democratic impact of various
veto points.
Criteria for Evaluating the Democratic Value of Veto Points
First, requirements that veto players and their vetoes are public and justified to a
public audience increase their legitimacy. Two closely related and central features of
functional democratic systems are accountability and transparency. These are important
values in both democracy’s majoritarian and non-majoritarian procedures. This is why,
for example, most legislative bodies have rules that permit a minority of members to
force a public, recorded vote count; in the United States, this is one of the few procedural
rules written into the Constitution: the “journal clause” of Article 1, sec. 5 empowers a
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one-fifth minority to demand a publicly recorded vote.56 If the exercise of vetoes are
effectively hidden from the public, some of the goals of democracy are less likely to be
well served.57 The use of veto points to promote domination, rather than prevent it, are
less likely to be effectively hidden from the citizenry, increasing their capacity to respond
negatively to such efforts. If we are to authorize and allow a veto power, we should also
demand justification and accountability from that exercise. This is consistent with the
notion that majoritarianism is the default guiding principle of democratic decisionmaking, and deviations from it should be done in a way that recognizes that status. The
exercisers of veto point power will inevitably have wide discretion over its use, but that
discretion should not be a cover to avoid the demand for public justification. A veto
player should not be able to avoid criticism and public responsibility for an unpopular or
controversial exercise of veto power. This is especially important given the iterated
nature of political conflict. If the justification for the exercise of a veto is poor, there are
numerous ways in which that veto player might conceivably be removed, or engaged to
behave differently in a future situation. Under this criterion, the modern “stealth
filibuster” (in which single senators can privately put “holds” on legislation or
supermajority requirements are simply assumed) in the United States Senate would be
more problematic than filibusters that at least require identifiable legislators or groups of
legislators to delay the passage of legislation with majority support.58
Secondly, veto points should, to the extent it is reasonably possible to do so, be
separated from the direct, personal private interests of veto players.59 The goal of
avoiding domination is not well-served when public institutions are easily subverted to
private ends. This criteria should not be construed too broadly; we are not suggesting that
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veto players (or any democratic actors) should be prohibited from legitimate political
action on behalf of any cause where there might be an overlapping interest or goal—
indeed, to do so might be consistent with a particularly high-minded version of
deliberative democracy, but would not at all be consistent with democracy-againstdomination. This criterion is meant narrowly and regards direct private gain accruing to
the individual veto player or her immediate associates, not to a political or social
movement or demographic group to which she might belong; the limitations on the latter
cases are better covered by the previous criteria as well as criteria five. When such a
separation is not possible, those private interests should be disclosed and justified. This is
a particularly difficult goal when considering legislative committees as veto points, as
legislators are likely to gain and maintain access to veto powers through committee
membership on issues of particular interest to them. Nevertheless, limiting and exposing
this connection is crucial to the separation of public and private interest. Limiting the
extent to which narrow, private interests can hijack public processes is necessary for
preventing democratic processes from becoming complicit in private domination.
Whatever benefits veto points might attain for democracy, they are also opportunities for
private interests to assert themselves in the democratic process. This should be lessened
or prevented, to the extent that it can.
Third, veto points should function not only to disallow “false positives” but
should provide a forum for weighing priorities in a context of limited resources. Here the
most important veto points in question are the committees in legislative bodies that
control the budget, and the federal agencies that inevitably wield considerable power over
which laws receive resources for enforcing. Priority-setting is a form of veto politics. A
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good deal of legislation is irrelevant without authorized funding (authorized by budget
legislation) and the will to enforce (by federal agencies and local governments). On the
one hand, this is a banal fact of political life. Nevertheless, the organization of authority
to exercise these powers can be done in more or less democratic ways. Domination exists
to various degrees throughout the political, economic and social realm and democracyagainst-domination is not a perfectionist political theory. Weighing the importance of
action based on the relative severity of instances of domination is central to this approach
to democracy, and if veto points can be directed toward this crucial political task, it is to
their credit.
Fourth, veto points should facilitate public contestation of government decision
and government action. Too often, the goal of public participation and influence is
understood as valuable only at the level of idea generation. But, as Scheppele has argued,
democracy takes place not merely during elections but between them as well.60 Veto
points can be an avenue for public participation and input, especially in cases where
ordinary legislative action has failed to reflect the priorities, needs, and will of the public
for various reasons. More veto points can mean more agenda-setting loci that lessen the
chances of particular groups being shut out of the process.61 This is particularly necessary
from a democracy-against-domination standpoint, which recognizes the extent to which
domination can arise in unintentional and unexpected ways. In Shapiro’s terms, just
hierarchies have an unfortunate tendency to atrophy into relationships of domination.62
Democratic veto points should create avenues for effective contestation for minority
populations subject to domination to the extent they can, whether that domination is due
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to malicious disregard in a part of the political process, indifference, or unintended
consequence.
And fifth, veto points are most valuable when they empower underrepresented
minorities as opposed to minorities already well- or over- represented within the political
system. While any democratic system will contain some countermajoritarian aspects, both
majority rule and the desirability of responsibility and accountability mean that
redundancy among multiple veto points is, all things being equal, problematic. If veto
points reliably over-represent interests that already enjoy strong representation, their
potential and actual democratic value is lessened considerably, as they become more
likely to serve as a tool of domination rather than provide protection against it. If an
increase in the diffusion of power within state institutions does not represent a more
diffuse array of social forces, such veto points are likely to reinforce patterns of social
domination rather than alleviating them. Evidently, this is a difficult standard: virtually
any institution is more likely than not to over-represent powerful interests. But the
comparative effects of veto points in this respect are especially important in determining
their democratic value. If veto points fail to substantially broaden representation and
involvement in political decision-making, Waldron’s normative vision becomes much
more attractive.
To illustrate, let us return to the filibuster in the United States Senate, an
institutional feature that is very difficult to defend from a democracy-against-domination
perspective. In practice, the filibuster has tended to exacerbate social domination, and
played a particularly dismal role in reinforcing white supremacy in the post-Civil War
South, starting with the successful filibuster of legislation seeking to maintain black
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access to the ballot in the late nineteenth century: “Beginning during Reconstruction and
continuing for nearly a century, anti-civil rights filibusters played a major role in
blocking measures to prohibit lynching, poll taxes, and race discrimination in
employment, housing, public accommodations, and voting.”63 The rule has never been
used in a similarly systematic way to protect the interests of underrepresented groups.
The filibuster can be expected to protect the interests of small, rural states—a potentially
legitimate goal, common in large, diverse democracies.64 However, given that such
groups are already greatly overrepresented in the composition of the Senate (which
exercises a veto over executive and federal judicial appointments) and somewhat
overrepresented in the House of Representatives and the Electoral College, it is difficult
to argue that the filibuster is democratically legitimate. “The filibuster,” Binder and
Smith conclude, “is used in ways that are hardly relevant to the nation’s welfare, in ways
that undermine Senate effectiveness on legislative matters unrelated to the targeted
measures.”65 On this criteria, the filibuster appears to be a particularly undemocratic veto
point.
But the filibuster, while it retains some defenders,66 is one of the most derided and
least defended contemporary veto points from a democratic perspective. To consider a
less obvious case: bicameralism also functions as a veto point. Can it be democratically
justified? While disavowing some examples of bicameralism, such as the profoundly
unrepresentative US Senate, Waldron thinks so. The democratic value of bicameralism,
for Waldron, comes from the potential value of difference, as long as the two legislative
bodies are both generally majoritarian. Arguing against Bentham’s critique of
bicameralism, Waldron suggests it may have added democratic value compared to a
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unicameral system, assuming it is property designed.67 No system of representation is
perfect:
No matter how good we make the scheme of representation in a given chamber,
no matter how many of our good thoughts about election, representation, and
deliberation we have already taken on board, it is always possible to improve
things by complementing that scheme of representation with another.68
Different schemes of representation, on Waldron’s logic here, can capture different
shades of majoritarian representation, which might complement each other in important
ways. It is easy to imagine how this might work: if a particular minority is spread out
across districts evenly in a legislative body comprised of single-member districts and
first-past-the-post elections, they might have little to no voice or power; if the second
chamber were elected via proportional representation, that could enhance their political
power and give them an important tool to resist domination. We agree with Waldron that
a bicameral system could plausibly be designed to accomplish such an end, but the
democratic benefits of such a proliferation of veto points must be weighed against the
democratic costs. A second co-equal chamber doubles the intra-legislative veto points
associated with committee hierarchies and procedural rules, doubling the opportunities
for status quo bias. It doubles the changes of an electoral majority finding itself unable
create a legislative majority due to the configuration of districts or the particulars of a
scheme of representation. Whatever advantages bicameralism might have must be
weighed against the costs that come with it, which is a significant enhancement of statusquo bias, inhibiting government’s potential to enact policies that respond to private
domination.69 While Waldron does identify some potential democratic benefits from
bicameralism as a veto point, its status as a legislative veto point does not eradicate its
democratic dangers. While the case for bicameralism as a democratic veto point is easier
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to imagine than the filibuster, it is far from clear that its status as legislative and
majoritarian is sufficient to declare it more democratic than judicial review on our
criteria.
Two final notes before we turn to evaluation of judicial review on the criteria
presented here. First, we do not give much consideration to different models of judicial
review: strong vs. weak, review of legislative vs. executive action, standing rules for
bringing a case to the court, and so on. In the real world, there is a great deal of variation
in the organization of judicial review in different democratic systems, and this very likely
matters when evaluating its democratic value.70 This issue is further complicated by
context: judicial view might also vary considerably in its democratic value depending on
the institutional context in which it is embedded, as well as the political, legal, and
cultural environment in which it is found. The best tools against domination are likely to
vary considerably, depending on the nature of the most prominent local threats to nondomination. So strong conclusions about judicial review’s democratic value in a
particular democratic system are likely to be contingent both on the organization of the
court and its powers and the larger institutional context in which it is embedded. The
criteria here are the beginning, not the end, of the evaluation of judicial review as
embedded in different political systems.
Second, we focus on the comparative evaluation of veto points in isolation. But
how might their combination and volume matter? On the one hand, whatever the merits
of judicial review or any other veto point, they may diminish should a political system
become overloaded with excessive veto points. This issue has been a point of
disagreement amongst democracy-against-domination theorists. Ian Shapiro has taken
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Pettit to task for embracing an “exceedingly long list” that weights outcomes toward “the
status quo and those who have the resources to wait out opponents.”71 On the other hand,
veto points may operate together to produce an effect that is more democratic than the
sum of their parts. An optimistic take on the democratic effects of the veto point-laden
American political system can be found in the recent work of Adrian Vermuele, in which
he urges readers to consider the possibility that the various countermajoritarian features
of the American constitutional order might lead to what he calls “emergent democracy”
via “offsetting failures of democracy” and the democratic distribution of undemocratic
powers.72
Both Shapiro’s and Vermuele’s warnings about interactive effects are worth
keeping in mind as we evaluate veto points in isolation. Existing scholarship on veto
points, however, suggests that Shapiro’s pessimism is more plausible than Vermuele’s
optimism. While the various veto points in the American political system are distributed
across different actors and interests, they are not distributed via a particularly democratic
pattern. The sheer volume of veto points has empowered economic elites to effectively
resist changes to the laws that would threaten their interests or curb their power, leading
to what Hacker and Pierson call legislative drift: powerful actors accommodating
themselves to the legislative status quo while thwarting legislative change to match such
innovations.73 In addition to this substantive worry, recent research suggests political
systems with excessive veto points might erode democratic cultural values as well, as
public opinion research shows that countries with veto point-laden systems tend to have a
much higher degree of authoritarian attitudes about politics.74 So even if certain veto
points have some democratic value, their cumulative effect may negate it.
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Evaluating Judicial Review
A thorough analysis of existing veto points’ democratic value is beyond our scope
here, but we will offer a preliminary assessment of judicial review by our identified
criteria. On the first criteria, judicial review would seem to stand up reasonably well.
Unlike a legislator quietly killing a bill in committee, or placing a ‘hold’ on legislation, or
a bureaucrat quietly issuing a directive to ‘de-prioritize’ the enforcement of a particular
law, Supreme Court decisions are overtly and formally public, and subject to at least a
modicum of popular scrutiny and debate. And even in comparison to other particularly
public veto points, such as the presidential veto, the need to offer justification is
formalized through legal decisions. However, this is not to suggest that judicial review
perfectly meets these criteria. For one thing, there is nothing to prevent disingenuous or
dishonest justifications.75 Jeremy Waldron has argued that defenders of judicial review
often, and incorrectly, hold up judicial reasoning as fundamentally superior in quality
compared to the low standards of public political debate.76 We agree with Waldron that
the quality of judicial reasoning is often overstated. However, the relevant comparison
here is not to idealized exercises of public reasoning but to other veto points, many of
which contain no public justification requirement. The justificatory requirements built
into judicial review are still a net positive compared to other veto points on this
criterion.77
On the second criteria, judicial review seems to have one distinct advantage over
legislative veto points. Specifically, the constant need of funding for re-election
campaigns, as well as ties to interests groups representing private industry, provide the
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possibility of private interests influencing the exercise of veto power. Consider, for
example, the case of Congressman Billy Tauzin. Upon his retirement from Congress in
2005 he immediately began a new job as a lobbyist for the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America. PhRMA outbid another major lobby, The Motion Picture
Association of America, paying him an annual salary of approximately $2.5 million.
While in Congress, Tauzin had occupied key positions on committees with a direct
relevance to the interests of both these lobbies.78 The relative insulation from the
channels of influence suggested by this story are much greater for judges than for
legislators. The example of Tauzin demonstrates a common and widespread concern
about private and powerful interests and the legislative process. Because judges need not
stand for re-election and rarely have significant post-Court careers, the pathways through
which their control of a key veto point could be used to advance private interests are
limited compared to members of congress. This requires two caveats, however. First,
there is no necessary link between direct financial gain and private interest. Judges, as
Waldron reminds us, are people too. They have identities, irrational biases, and
allegiances to groups both political and personal that could lead to undue private
influence. Second, for politicians the threat of private influence is widely understood, and
has resulted in a panoply of measures (such as ethics rules and campaign finance laws) to
track and limit it. Judges may be subject to less scrutiny on this front.
The third criteria might seem to have little bearing on the democratic quality of
judicial review as a veto point. Constitutional courts are generally not tasked with
prioritizing various laws, but with sorting them into three broad categories:
constitutionally mandatory, constitutionally optional, and unconstitutional. Moreover, the
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opportunity costs that might be associated with abandoning a particular path on
constitutional grounds are frequently often outside of the purview of courts. But courts
may exercise a great deal of discretion in the cases they decide to consider. The choice of
cases that courts may choose to review reveals a great deal of discretion in whether to
intervene in any particular constitutional controversy. Finally, it is possible that judicial
review as a veto point has the potential to provide a forum for considering whether a
particular “costly” form of rights protection is in fact fundamental and constitutional. For
example, Brown v. Prata recently forced the state of California to make choices about the
costs of rights protection with respect to rights violations associated with the
overcrowding of California’s prison system.79 Courts can potentially elevate and identify
a claim that a particular constitutional priority has been de-prioritized to the point that a
rights violation can be identified, even if they are not in a position to offer a precise
remedy to this problem. Previous scholars who emphasize judicial review’s deliberative
value have demonstrated its potential on this criteria.80
The fourth criteria invites contrasts between different systems of organizing and
empowering courts to engage in judicial review. An important democratic function of
veto points is to provide avenues for contestation beyond and between elections. While
not sufficient to meet the demand for contestatory institutional arrangements, judicial
review can provide this possibility in a limited set of cases. Some regimes of judicial
review (for example, in Hungary and India) allow for direct petition of the constitutional
court on behalf of citizens, without first proceeding through a series of lower courts. In
the Hungarian case in particular this has enhanced democratic participation.81
Nevertheless, despite the high barriers, this remains an avenue for contestation of some
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forms of domination. So, at a general level, judicial review appears to have the potential
to serve as a relatively democratic veto point on this criteria. A number of previous
scholars have emphasized judicial review’s positive democratic valence on participatory
grounds.82
The fifth democratic criteria for veto points require they must be comparatively
likely to empower generally disempowered minorities. Obviously, judicial review’s
likelihood to empower underrepresented and disempowered minorities will vary
considerably, and it is difficult to reach general conclusions at a high level of abstraction.
For Ran Hirschl, the case against judicial review hinges on the case that judicial review
tends to further empower economic elites, who are over-represented among both judges
and those who create and design systems of judicial review.83 However, in reply to some
of his critics,84 Hirschl concedes that despite the further empowerment of economic
elites, “women, ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians, and indigenous populations are
likely to be far better off in the constitutionalization era.”85 Furthermore, Kim
Scheppele’s research on constitutional courts in Hungary demonstrates that courts can
and do intervene on behalf of the economically vulnerable in some cases.86 It would
obviously be a mistake to view judicial review as a tool that reliably empowers
disempowered minorities, of course, but there seems to be evidence that it may, at times,
serve as a veto point for those who are unlikely to have access to other veto points—
particularly those groups who fall into a category comparable to Justice Stone’s “discrete
and insular minorities.” Still, as a contestatory rather than legislative veto point, judicial
review appears to have advantages on this point compared to veto points such as the
filibuster.
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Conclusion: Towards an Institutional, Contextual, and Comparative Democratic
Theory
We have argued that any democratic theory needs a general comparative theory of
democratic veto points before we can meaningfully assess particular veto points like
judicial review, and we have attempted a preliminary effort in this regard from the
perspective of democracy-against-domination. The line of argument we pursue here
effectively rules out a simple theoretical resolution to the question of judicial review’s
democratic status. While this frustrates any effort to bring our analysis to a tidy
conclusion, we can safely conclude that it is theoretically and empirically unsound to
dismiss judicial review as anti-democratic solely on anti-majoritarian grounds, and that it
appears it may have greater democratic value than many other common veto points.
Beyond that, we conclude with a review of what we take to be the most important lessons
for democratic theorists in light of this analysis.
First, democratic theory must be institutional and contextual in orientation. We
cannot assess the democratic value of different veto points and institutional arrangements
generally as a purely formal matter. We must rely to no small degree on the important
work of scholars of institutions and regime politics. While it has begun to unravel, the
longstanding consensus view amongst legal and democratic theorists that judicial review
presented a uniquely countermajoritarian difficulty stood for far too long, even as our
empirical colleagues painted a very different and far more complicated picture, in which
legislatures and judges are as likely to work together as to be at odds, and judicial review
rarely strayed much further from majoritarian positions than legislatures. The real-life
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consequences of institutional political arrangements are as important as their formal
structure, and the former cannot be simply derived from the latter. Perhaps the greatest
democratic threat associated with judicial review comes not from unelected judges
thwarting legislative majorities, but from the diffusion of power and responsibility
through legislative deferrals, as Lovell amongst others have shown.87 But without
attention to historical and institutional empirical scholarship on courts, the nature of the
democratic challenge that judicial review presents would not have been noticed.
Attention to this scholarship gives some reason to doubt the wisdom of attempting
to sort institutional arrangements and decision-making strategies into two discrete
categories, majoritarian and nonmajoritarian. Once we recognize that any scheme of
representation removes us from straightforward majoritarian decision-making as applied
to citizens, two things become clear. First, the majoritarian nature of any particular
decision-making strategy must be measured substantively as well as procedurally, as the
latter does not directly determine the former. This makes determinative assessments of
comparative majoritarianism a bit difficult to make. Second, since democracy has other
associated values and demands beyond majoritarianism, it becomes one axis on which the
democratic valence of the institutional arrangement can be measured, alongside the others
identified here.
Second, democratic theory’s reflections and assessments of institutional
arrangements requires a substantial comparative dimension. Such an approach further
illustrates the difficulty of saying anything too definitive about judicial review’s (or other
veto points’) democratic value in the abstract. In addition to the potentially different
values of different forms of review, the way it interacts with the rest of the democratic
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system may shape its democratic value. For example, the circumstances that surround
judicial review’s creation may matter: if it is created, as Ran Hirschl argues it was in
Israel, New Zealand and elsewhere, to extend the political influence of the current ruling
coalition well into the future, after they would have otherwise lost power its democratic
value may not be as great, at least initially.88 Of course, once an institutional power such
as judicial review is established, it can take on a life of its own beyond what its creators
intended. The democratic value of judicial review may function differently in different
political systems but also in different political cultures. Scheppele’s research on the
democratic value of judicial review in Hungary in the 1990s hinges on the contestatory
role they played in the absence of a robust contestatory civil society, alongside the
weaknesses of elections in holding officials accountable, suggesting the weaknesses and
fragility of Hungary’s democratic culture made judicial review all the more valuable.89
The experience of judicial review in different institutional and cultural contexts will be
crucial to understanding the circumstances and forms of review most (and least) likely to
effectively promote democracy-against-domination.
In other words, a comparative context is absolutely crucial for making sense of
the democratic value of judicial review and other veto points. The functioning of a
particular veto point—whether its contestatory value turns out to be accessible only to
elites or to groups at greater risk of domination, for example—cannot be determined in
isolation, and may turn out to be idiosyncratic. In assessing the first few decades of the
current renaissance in comparative law, Ran Hirschl laments the field’s “near-exclusive
focus on a dozen liberal democracies” from which inferences about the functioning of
courts are drawn.90 A similar worry surely could be expressed regarding democratic
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theory’s assessment of institutional arrangements. Why, for example, did judicial review
seem to make a significant contribution to Hungary’s democratization in the 1990s? Was
there something about the context of post-communism that rendered it particularly
valuable—and, given recent events, particularly fragile? Questions like this are unlikely
to be answered by reflecting on only one, or a small group of democratic political
systems. The growth and maturation of comparative constitutional studies as a field will
be an ongoing valuable resource for democratic theory.
Despite judicial review’s evident limitations and drawbacks, we conclude that it
appears to have some modest advantages over other veto points commonly found in
contemporary political systems. But we are less committed to this conclusion than we are
to the approach to applied democratic theory by which we have arrived at it. If further
analysis of the effects of judicial review relative to other democratic veto points suggests
a net negative democratic value, or if judicial review fails on additional democratic
criteria we have not identified here, a re-evaluation of our conclusion would be
appropriate. The democracy-against-domination approach focuses our attention on those
members and groups in society most vulnerable to domination. Judicial review will
almost certainly fail to provide a consistent and reliable path to successful contestation of
dominating practices and structures and full democratic representation. But a democratic
theory that takes power and institutions seriously cannot place its hope in a simple, single
institutional fix to the problem of inequitable power relations, as no such “bulwark” can
reliably exist.
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